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Bank Competition and Collateral: Theory and Evidence 
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Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan 
contracts. We develop a theoretical model incorporating information asymmetries in a 
spatial competition framework where banks choose between screening the borrower 
and asking for collateral. We show that the presence of collateral is more likely when 
bank competition is low. We then test this prediction empirically on a sample of bank 
loans from 70 countries. We perform logit regressions of the presence of collateral on 
bank competition, measured by the Lerner index. Our empirical tests corroborate the 
theoretical predictions that bank competition reduces the presence of collateral. These 




JEL Codes: G21, D43, D82. 




  - 2 -1. Introduction 
Following the significant structural changes of the banking industry witnessed 
around the globe, much theoretical and empirical work has examined the economic 
role of bank competition in recent years.
1 Among other questions the impact of bank 
competition on the access to bank finance has been investigated, as benefits from 
bank competition are intuitively expected in the form of lower loan rates which should 
favor this access (e.g. Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the role of bank competition on the access to bank finance also 
depends on its effects on collateral use, as collateral requirements are repeatedly 
mentioned as a major financing obstacle. For instance, by relying on the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) for firms in 80 countries, Beck et al. (2006) 
report that collateral requirements are rated as the third most important obstacle 
among 12 financing obstacles, just after high interest rates and access to long-term 
loans. One can therefore wonder how bank competition influences the use of 
collateral.  
However research on the effect of bank competition on collateral is 
impressively poor. To investigate this effect, we develop a theoretical model with 
asymmetric information about the firm’s creditworthiness. Banks can solve the 
resulting adverse selection problem either by screening or by collateralization. With a 
screening contract banks have to incur costs, which increase in the distance to the 
firm, to get a perfect signal on the creditworthiness. Since they can observe the firm’s 
location, they are able to price-discriminate. With a collateralized contract firms self-
select themselves, but costs arise if collateralized assets are liquidated.  
We show that firms that are located close to a bank are financed by a screening 
contract and those further away by a collateralized contract. The reason is that the 
banks offer the most cost-efficient contract and screening costs are low for those firms 
that are close to the bank. As the number of banks increases and competition 
intensifies the fraction of firms financed by a screening contract increases. 
We then test our theoretical predictions empirically with a cross-country 
analysis on a sample of 4,931 bank loans from 70 countries. We perform logit 
regressions for the presence of collateral dependent on bank competition. Bank 
competition is measured by the Lerner index, which infers banks’ conduct directly 
                                                           
1 See the special issue of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking in 2004 (vol. 36, n°3) on this topic. 
  - 3 -and then informs on the actual behavior of the bank. The empirical analysis confirms 
the model’s prediction that bank competition decreases the use of collateral. 
There are only a few other papers about the relationship between bank 
competition and collateralization. The theoretical papers study how either the adverse 
selection or the moral hazard problem is solved by collateralization. Manove, Padilla 
and Pagano (2001) use a model in which banks choose between screening the 
borrower and asking the latter to pledge collateral. In their model, the bank gets a 
signal on whether a firm will repay or not through screening but only a signal about 
their probability to repay through collateralization. Competing banks offer different 
contracts that allow firms with a high probability to repay to collateralize which is 
more attractive to them than a screening contract. Socially, however, it would be 
beneficial to have all firms screened and the monopolistic bank as a residual claimant 
would screen them. Thus, the paper predicts that borrowers are more likely to post 
collateral in competitive markets than in monopolistic markets.  
Berlin and Butler (2002) develop a model based on the possibility of 
renegotiation between the bank and the borrower. This renegotiation can take place 
after the completion of the initial loan contract and depends on new information 
obtained by the bank. They support the view that bank competition leads to lower 
collateral requirements, which results from the incentives of the bank to proceed to 
renegotiation. Both former models consider the role of collateral in solving adverse 
selection problems, and offer opposing predictions.  
In contrast, Hainz (2003) proposes a model in which collateral helps solve 
moral hazard problems. At the same time, collateral can be used to extract rent from 
borrowers. Through collateralization the payoff of the firm in the case of failure is 
reduced. This allows the bank to demand a higher repayment in the case of success, 
without destroying the firm’s incentives. This model predicts that competition reduces 
the use of collateral. 
On the empirical side, two recent papers can be related to the impact of bank 
competition on the use of collateral, although they do not focus primarily on this 
issue. Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) investigate a wide range of determinants of 
the presence of collateral on a large sample of loans granted by Spanish banks. They 
notably analyze the impact of bank concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index, 
and find a negative impact of bank concentration on collateral use. Berger et al. 
(2007) test whether the adoption of a lending technology reducing ex ante information 
  - 4 -asymmetries, i.e. small business credit scoring, is associated with lower collateral use 
in loan contracts in the US. Bank concentration measured by the Herfindahl index is 
included as a control variable. They find no significant sign for bank concentration to 
explain the incidence of collateral in their estimations. 
We can thus point out that the theoretical literature provides conflicting 
predictions which lack empirical tests for their validation. The aim of this paper is to 
provide a broad and consistent analysis of the role of bank competition on the use of 
collateral, based on theoretical and empirical investigation. In an innovative 
theoretical explanation, we incorporate information asymmetries in an industrial 
organization framework. Our theoretical model is related to Manove, Padilla and 
Pagano (2001) but we differ from this model in two major aspects. The first difference 
concerns the fact that banks are not lazy in our model, in the sense that there is no 
additional information on the borrower that the bank can obtain. The second 
difference is the modeling of the market structure. Following recent theoretical works 
on bank competition (e.g. Dell’Arricia, 2001; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006), we 
consider a spatial competition framework based on a circular economy. Such 
representation is closer to the reality of banking markets, marked more by 
differentiation than monopoly or oligopoly. That geographical distance shapes lending 
rates of banks is empirically shown by Degryse and Ongena (2005).  
We also depart from the empirical studies in two important respects. We do not 
focus on a single country for our study – which may lead to country-specific results – 
but we perform a cross-country analysis. By measuring bank competition with the 
Lerner index we infer the banks’ conduct directly, which is in line with the recent 
empirical works on bank competition (Martin, Salas and Saurina, 2006; Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, 2007). Thereby, we do not have to rely on concentration 
measures that infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as market 
shares. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical 
model. In section III, we develop the empirical results. We finally provide some 
concluding remarks in section IV. 
 
 
  - 5 -II. Theoretical model 
II.1 Set up of the model 
We start by describing the characteristics of the firms possibly applying for a 
loan and of the banking sector. Firms want to undertake an investment project that 
costs I. Due to the lack of their own liquid funds, the firms need to finance their 
investment through credit. The firms’ owners are endowed with an asset A>I that can 
potentially be offered as collateral.  
There exists a continuum of firms, the number of which is normalized to 1. 
Firms are distributed uniformly around a circle of length 1. The fraction of good firms 
is  and that of bad firms is (1-). The good firms have a project that is successful 
with probability p. In the case of success, the project’s payoff is X, while in the case 
of failure it is 0. Thus, the expected payoff of a good firm is pX-I>0, which we 
assume to be positive. Bad firms will fail with probability 1. If bad firms receive a 
loan, they take the money and run. Since there are no costs of application, both good 
and bad firms apply for loans.  
We consider a banking sector with N identical banks that are located 




Banks compete in repayments. They cannot observe the firm’s type, i.e. whether a 
particular firm is good or bad. However, they know the distribution of good and bad 
firms. Moreover, banks can observe the firm’s location. Having this information 
allows a bank to price-discriminate because it can make the offer contingent on the 
firm’s location. We assume that banks possess enough funds to finance all firms that 
apply for loans and that the firms’ returns (and in the case of collateralization their 
assets) are high enough such that the market is covered. 
Banks have two means to discriminate between good and bad firms: they either 
offer a collateralized credit contract which induces firms to signal their type, or they 
screen all firms applying for credit by evaluating their credit proposals. In the case of 
screening, banks receive a perfect signal about a firm’s creditworthiness. The 
screening costs c are proportional to the distance d between bank and firm, i.e. the 
further away a firm is located from a bank, the higher are the screening costs. The 
idea is that the bank already possesses more costless information if a firm is located 
close-by because, for instance, through a relationship it can observe the firm’s daily 
business, quality of management or competitive position. Consequently, the effort the 
  - 6 -bank has to incur to get a perfect signal is lower.
2 Alternatively, distance could be 
interpreted as a measure for the strength of the relationship between the bank and the 
firm. A screening contract is viable option for the bank because we assume that even 
when financing a firm that is located next to the competing bank, the bank could make 
non-negative profits, i.e.  0 ¡Ý
1
N
c I pX   .  
In the case of collateralization, the bank gets a payoff from the collateralized 
assets that are liquidated if the project fails. There are costs associated with 
liquidation. Therefore, the liquidation value of each unit of collateral, denoted by α, is 
lower than the continuation value of the firm, i.e., α < 1. We want to render 
collateralization a viable option if the competitor offers a screening contract. 
Therefore we assume that at least for the customer that is located half-way between 
two banks, the costs of a collateralized contract are below those of a screening 





1 1     . Moreover, we assume that for firms located closer 
to the bank that offers the screening contract, screening is a viable option by assuming 
() () I α 1 p 1
N 4
c
- - < . Note that offering a contract without either screening or 
collateralization does not pay off, because we assume that pX-I<0. 
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, banks decide 
simultaneously which type of contract they offer. In the second stage, banks 
determine simultaneously the terms of the credit contract they offer. Firms apply at 
the bank which offers the contract with the most favorable terms. We assume that if 
banks offer the same repayments, firms apply at the closest bank.
3 Finally, payoffs are 
realized. 
We solve the game by backward induction. Thus, we first analyse the contract 
terms for a situation in which either both banks offer the same type of contract or 
different types of contracts. In a second step, we show when a particular contract is 
optimal.  
In our model, each firm has two banks that are in its neighborhood. We denote 
the bank that is closest to the firm as bank 1 and the other bank as bank 2. Without 
                                                           
2 Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) provide empirical evidence that distance matters for the 
informativeness of a signal. We capture the impact of distance not on the informativeness of the signal 
(as in Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) but on the costs needed to generate a perfect signal. 
3 We would obtain the same qualitative result if firms had to incur some costs of application. 
  - 7 -loss of generality, we can restrict our analysis to the competition between one bank 
and its nearest competitor. Thus, we analyze competition for firms that are located at a 








; 0   from bank 1. 
 
II.2 Collateralized credit contract 
We first suppose that all banks offer a collateralized credit contract. Firms 
compare the repayments announced by the bank and choose the contract with the most 
favorable terms. Collateralization implies that the firm repays an amount R
L in the 
case of success and that it loses collateral in the amount L in the case of failure. The 
credit contract has to be designed in such a way that the bad firms have no incentive 
to demand credit. This is reached through collateralization. The incentive 
compatibility constraint for a bad firm can be written as:  
(IC.BF_L)                             I L




If a bad firm receives a loan of the amount I (and runs away with the money), it 
will lose assets in the amount L as the project fails with certainty. Therefore, it is 
obvious that the amount of collateral that prevents bad firms from applying for credit 
is I. As a result, bad firms do not apply for loans. Moreover, the good firm has to be at 
least as well off with a loan as without a loan, i.e.  . 
Finally, the bank must be willing to offer a contract because its participation 
constraint is fulfilled as well, i.e. 
A     I)   -   (A   p)   -   (1   )   R   -   X     (A   p
L ¡Ý + +
    I I p 0 ¡Ý 1   pR
L  
L
. The results are 
summarized in the following lemma where   denotes the bank’s expected profits: 
 





L   

1 1




. Each bank makes zero expected profits.  
 
Proof: See the Appendix A. 
 
  - 8 -Banks have identical cost structures because the liquidation value of collateral is 
the same for all. This means that there is perfect competition between banks which 
drives their profits down to zero. They all demand the same repayments and therefore 
they serve firms up to the marginal customer which is located half-way between a 
bank and its competitor. No bank has an incentive to demand a higher repayment 
because then it would lose the customer. It does not have an incentive to undercut 
either because then it would make a loss. The repayment is determined by the bank’s 
participation constraint. Note that the firm’s participation constraint is fulfilled 
because otherwise collateralization would not be a viable option. 
 
II.3 Screening contract 
We next suppose that all banks offer a screening contract. The distance to bank 




. The bank demands a repayment of R
S in 
the case of success and zero otherwise, because the owner’s personal assets are not 
pledged as collateral. To break even, the bank needs a repayment of R
S that is 
determined by its participation constraint which is (where subscripts 1, 2 are used to 
denote the bank): 
(PC.B1_S)     cd I pR
S 0 ¡Ý - 1        for bank 1 and  
(PC.B2_S)     d
N









       for bank 2.  
Banks can price-discriminate and they marginally undercut the competitor’s 
offer. Since we assume that firms take the loan from the closest bank, this implies that 
bank 1 demands the same repayment as bank 2. We summarize the result in the 
following lemma. 
 


















 and serves all firms up to a distance of 
N 2
1
. Each bank 




S - =.  
 
Proof: See the Appendix A. 
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firm’s outside option. This outside option is to take a loan from bank 2. The further 
away bank 2 is, the higher the repayment bank 2 needs to break even. This implies 
that a firm has to repay more the closer it is located to bank 1. This paradoxical 
situation is due to the hold-up problem which the firm faces and is supported by 
empirical evidence (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). In equilibrium, each bank serves all 
customers up to the one that is located half-way between the bank and its competitor. 
Banks can extract rents and thereby make positive expected profits for each customer 
which decrease for more distant customers. Distance influences the bank’s profit 
through two channels. First, the further away a firm is from bank 1, the lower the 
repayment demanded by bank 2. Second, for these firms the screening costs of bank 1 
are higher which additionally reduces profit. 
 
II.4 One bank screens, the other bank collateralizes 
We first study the case in which bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a 
collateralized contract (we therefore use the superscript SL to denote by S (L) that 
bank 1 (2) offers a screening (collateralized) contract). Then a firm that is located at a 
distance d from bank 1 has the outside option of getting a collateralized credit contract 
from bank 2. Which contract is the least costly depends on the the firm’s location. The 
results are summarized in the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 3: Suppose bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a 










 through a screening contract with   
p
p
I   R  




With each of these firms bank 1 makes an expected profit per customer of 
. Bank 2 finances firms that are located at      cd I p





   
through a collateralized contract demanding 
p
cd
I   R  
SL   2  and L=I. With each firm 
bank 2 makes an expected profit per customer of    I p cd
SL       1 1 2 . 
   
Proof: See the Appendix A. 
 
  - 10 -The firm has the outside option to demand a collateralized credit contract from 
bank 2. Bank 2 offers a contract that breaks even (see Lemma 1). Given this offer, 
bank 1 has to decide which repayment to demand. For firms that are located close to 
bank 1, bank 1 has low screening costs and it can match the expected repayment that 
bank 2 demands for a collateralized contract. This repayment is higher than the 
repayment bank 1 needs to break even. With these firms, bank 1 makes positive 
expected profits. The closer a firms is located to the bank, the lower are the bank’s 
screening costs and the higher is its profit. 
However, for firms that are located further away from bank 1 the screening 
costs can exceed the costs of a collateralized contract. Thus, bank 2 has a cost 
advantage and can match bank 1’s offer. These firms will choose the collateralized 
contract and be financed by bank 2. With these firms, bank 2 makes positive expected 
profits. The profits per customer are higher the further away the firm is from bank 1 
because the hold-up problem the firms face (by bank 2) is more severe. 
 
Next, we study a situation in which bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and 












break even when serving a customer that is located at a distance d from bank 1. The 
result is as follows: 
 
Lemma 4:  
Suppose bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and bank 2 a screening contract. 




















1  and L=I. It makes expected profits of 
  I p d
N
c









Proof: See the Appendix A. 
 




bank 2. This implies that it is rather costly for bank 2 to screen and, consequently, the 
repayment must be sufficiently high to cover these screening costs. As a result, bank 1 
can win the competition by matching bank 2’s offer. The closer a firm is to bank 1, 
the higher is the repayment bank 2 needs to break even and the worse is the firm’s 
outside option. For bank 1 these firms are particularly profitable because for them the 
hold-up problem is the most severe. Therefore, bank 1’s profit decreases in the 
distance to the firm. 
 
II.4 Comparison of contracts 
Solving the game by backward induction, we next identify the contracts that are 
offered by banks. Therefore, we look for the Nash equilibrium and find the following 
result for the contracts through which a firm is financed: 
 










 are financed by a screening contract. Firms that are located 
further away are financed by a collateralized contract. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix A. 
 
When deriving the Nash equilibrium, we find that given that the other bank 
offers a collateralized credit contract, offering a screening contract is a (weakly) 
dominant strategy. However, the best response of a bank to the competitor offering a 
screening contract depends on the distance of the firm to which this contract is 
offered. For bank 1 this means that the best response is to offer a screening contract 
for all firms up to a distance of   and the (weakly) best response is to offer a 
collateralized contract for those firms that are located further away. For bank 2 the 
(weakly) best response if bank 1 offers a screening contract is to offer a screening 





d ˆ  , and to offer a 
collateralized contract for those firms that are located further away.  
  - 12 -The Nash equilibrium is that both banks offer a screening contract if  d
~
d   and 
firms are financed by bank 1. For  d ˆ d d
~
  , the weakly dominant strategy of bank 1 
(bank 2) is to offer a collateralized (screening) contract. As a result, firms in this 






  , both banks offer collateralized contracts and firms are financed by bank 
1. 
 
We use this result to study the impact of bank competition on collateralization 
and find that: 
 
Proposition 2:  The fraction of firms financed by a collateralized contract 
decreases as the banking sector becomes more competitive, i.e. N is higher. 
  
Proof: See the Appendix A. 
 
Up to the threshold d
~
 firms are screened. This threshold does not change with 
the number of banks. However, as the number of banks increases, the distance 
between banks decreases. This means that the “range” in which collateralized contract 




III. Empirical evidence 
The theoretical model shows that greater bank competition lowers collateral 
requirements. We now bring empirical evidence to bear on this issue. We first 
describe data and variables, before explaining how we measure bank competition. We 
then develop the empirical results. 
 
III.1. Data and variables 
The sample of bank loans is obtained from the Dealscan database, which is 
supplied by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). This database is commonly 
  - 13 -used in empirical studies on bank loans (e.g. Dahiya et al., 2003; Bharath et al., 2007; 
Qian and Strahan, 2007). 
We use loan data for the period January 2000 to December 2005 as it is the 
period with the best coverage for both loans and banks. Following Qian and Strahan 
(2007), we drop loans to firms from the financial industry (SIC 6) and from the public 
sector (SIC 9). Public ownership or a monopoly situation are likely to influence the 
risk of loans granted to these firms, which may bias the use of collateral in 
comparison to what would be observed in manufacturing and other services. These 
criteria produced a sample of 4,931 bank loans made to borrowers located in 70 
countries. A list of countries is displayed in table 1. 
The focus of our research is to investigate the relationship between the presence 
of collateral and the degree of bank competition. To this end, we proceed to 
regressions of the presence of collateral on a set of variables including bank 
competition and a wide range of control variables including loan-level and country-
level variables. 
The explained variable is the presence of collateral, which is measured by a 
dummy variable (Collateral) equal to one if the loan is secured and to zero if it is not. 
The explanatory variable of primary concern is the Lerner index (Lerner Index), 
measuring bank competition. We use the mean Lerner index for each country. Its 
computation is described in the next subsection. Bank-level data are taken from the 
“Bankscope” database of BVD-IBCA. 
We use five loan-level control variables to take loan characteristics into account. 
These include information on loan maturity (Maturity), and on the type of loan, which 
is controlled through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is a term loan and zero 
otherwise (Loan Type).
4 We control for the number of lenders involved in the loan by 
measuring the logarithm of the number of lenders (Number of Lenders), following 
Qian and Strahan (2007). We also take into account information on loan size (Loan 
Size), which is defined as the value of the loan facility in thousands of dollars. Finally, 
the presence of covenants in the loan contracts is controlled through a dummy 
variable equal to one if the loan contract includes covenants and zero otherwise 
(Covenants). 
                                                           
4 A term loan is defined in Dealscan as an instalment loan where amounts repaid may not be 
reborrowed. 
  - 14 -We also use five country-level variables to take into account financial and 
economic development, and the legal environment. Financial Development is the ratio 
of the volume of credit to private enterprises to GDP. This ratio measures the extent to 
which credit is allocated to private firms. It is widely used in the empirical literature 
to proxy for the development of financial intermediaries (e.g. Beck and Levine, 2004). 
Bank Costs is defined as the mean ratio of overhead costs to total assets for all banks. 
Information comes from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2000) for both of these 
variables. Economic Development is defined as the logarithm of GDP per capita, with 
data coming from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Following a large body of research on law and finance pioneered by La Porta et 
al. (1997), we also adopt two variables for the impact of legal environment. Protection 
of creditor rights (Creditor Rights) is measured with the index developed by La Porta 
et al. (1998) and updated by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). This index is 
scored on a scale from zero to four with a higher score indicating better protection. It 
considers four aspects of the protection of creditor rights. Law enforcement is 
measured with the ‘Rule of Law’ index provided by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2007) on a yearly basis (Rule of Law). This indicator refers to “the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society”. It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 
with greater values associated with better law enforcement. 
Dummy variables for each industry (for each 1-digit SIC code) and each year 
are also included in the estimations to control for industry and year effects. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in table 2. 
 
III.2 The measurement of bank competition 
Empirical research on the measurement of bank competition provides several 
tools, which can be divided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and the 
new empirical IO approaches. The traditional IO approach proposes tests of market 
structure to assess bank competition based on the Structure Conduct Performance 
(SCP) model. The SCP hypothesis argues that greater concentration causes less 
competitive bank conduct and leads to greater profitability of the bank.
5 According to 
this, competition can be measured by concentration indices such as the market share 
                                                           
5 This can lower performance in terms of social welfare because higher interest rates worsen firms’ 
incentives (Schnitzer, 1999). 
  - 15 -of the largest banks, or by the Herfindahl index. These tools were widely applied until 
the 1990s. 
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the 
problems of the measures of competition provided by the traditional IO approach. 
These latter measures suffer from the fact that they infer the degree of competition 
from indirect proxies such as market structure or market shares. In comparison, non-
structural measures do not infer the competitive conduct of banks through the analysis 
of market structure, but rather measure banks’ conduct directly. 
Following the new empirical IO approach, we compute the Lerner index for 
each bank of our sample, and then measure bank competition for each country by the 
mean Lerner index. The Lerner index has been computed in several recent studies on 
bank competition (e.g. Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, 2007; Martin, 
Saurina and Salas, 2006). It is defined as the difference between the price and the 
marginal cost, divided by the price. 
The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production 
(proxied by total assets) as the ratio of total revenues to total assets, following 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004). The marginal cost is estimated on the 
basis of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input prices 
(price of labor, price of physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). One cost 
function is estimated for each year to allow technology to change over time.  We 
impose the restriction of linear homogeneity in input prices by normalizing total costs 














































































































































  - 16 - 
where  TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w1 the price of labor (the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets)
6, w2 the price of physical capital (the ratio of other 
non-interest expenses to fixed assets), w3 the price of borrowed funds (the ratio of 
paid interests to all funding). Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, other 
non-interest expenses and paid interest. The indices for each bank have been dropped 
from the presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated coefficients of the cost 
function are then used to compute the marginal cost. 
 
III.3 Results 
Because the dependent variable, the presence of collateral, is a binary variable, 
we perform logit regressions following Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) and Berger 
et al. (2007).
7 We estimate four logit regressions on the use of collateral by testing 
different combinations of control variables. The first regression includes all loan-level 
and country-level control variables (column 1). The second one includes no country-
level control variable (column 2). The third one skips the legal variables (Creditor 
Rights and Rule of Law) (column 3), while the fourth regression skips the economic 
and financial variables (Economic Development, Financial Development, Bank Costs) 
(column 4). In computing standard errors, we cluster by borrower. 
The major finding is the positive coefficient of the Lerner Index, which is 
significant at the 1% level in all regressions. We therefore observe that the presence of 
collateral is more likely when the degree of bank competition is lower. As a 
consequence, our estimations clearly support our theoretical prediction on the impact 
of bank competition on the use of collateral. This result is in sharp contrast with the 
negative link between bank concentration and collateral use observed by Jimenez, 
Salas and Saurina (2006) or the absence of link between both variables obtained by 
Berger et al. (2007). However, these studies focus on one single country and use 
concentration indices to measure bank competition, which limit their relevance for the 
investigation of the role of bank competition on the presence of collateral.  
                                                           
6 As the Bankscope database does not provide information on the number of employees, we use this 
proxy variable for the price of labor following Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004, 2007). 
7 We adopt the logit model rather than the probit model, because Akaike and Schwarz information 
criteria are lower in logit regressions. However, we have also performed the probit regressions as a 
robustness check, and found similar results. 
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positive for Maturity, Number of Lenders,  Loan Type, and Covenants, while it is 
significantly negative for Loan Size. Our results thus suggest that a loan is more likely 
to be secured when it has a longer maturity, a greater number of lenders, some 
covenants, or when it is a term loan. In the opposite, larger loans are less likely to be 
secured. These findings are in line with the empirical literature showing that riskier 
loans are more likely to be secured (e.g. Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). 
Regarding the country-level variables, we find a positive and significant 
influence for Bank Costs and Creditor Rights, suggesting that banks with higher costs 
and benefiting from better protection of creditor rights are more likely to ask for 
collateral. The coefficient for Rule of Law is negative but only significant in one 
specification. Economic Development and Financial Development are not significant 
in the estimations. These findings are consistent with Qian and Strahan (2007) who 
investigate how legal and institutional variables influence loan characteristics 
including the presence of collateral. 
To further address the validity of the results, we use an alternative measure for 
bank competition in our estimations. Following the wide utilization of concentration 
indices in the literature, we take an indicator of bank concentration as a natural 
robustness check, even if we are fully aware of the limitations of such indices as 
mentioned above. Bank concentration is measured by the assets of the three largest 
banks as a share of all commercial banks (Concentration). Information comes again 
from the Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2000)’s database. Table 4 displays the 
estimations with bank concentration. We observe a positive coefficient for 
Concentration, which is significant in three of the four specifications, meaning that 
bank concentration favors the presence of collateral. Therefore, these results 
corroborate those obtained with the Lerner index. 
Another source of skepticism might concern Dealscan database, which includes 
many syndicated loans. Consequently, the loan can be granted by a syndicate of banks 
from different countries, which might make it hard to consider the degree of 
competition of one country as relevant to explain the use of collateral. However, 
investigating the sample shows that a large number of banks involved in the 
syndicated loans are domestic banks. Without meaning that all lenders are domestic, 
this stresses the fact that bank competition at the domestic level clearly matters. From 
the perspective of syndicated loans practitioners (Taylor and Sansone, 2007), the 
  - 18 -strong implication of domestic banks in syndicated loans is in line with, on the one 
hand, the fact that the arrangers are usually relationship banks, which are generally 
local banks with respect to the borrower’s country (Esty, 2001), and, on the other 
hand, the fact that the presence of local lenders reduces problems related to 
information asymmetries (Sufi, 2007). Nevertheless, we perform additional 
estimations to check whether our findings are dependent on the presence of 
syndicated loans. In this aim, we keep only single-lender loans, resulting in a strong 
reduction of the sample size. The loan sample then includes 1,173 loans from 43 
countries. The results of these estimations are reported in table 5. Once again, we find 
that bank competition exerts a positive and significant impact on the use of collateral. 
The only changes concern the significance of some country-level control variables. 
Therefore, in spite of the limitations of Dealscan database, these additional points 
support the relevance of our results. 
Our findings have thus survived several robustness checks, leading to the strong 
support of our theoretical prediction that a loan is more likely to be secured if 
competition is lower in the banking industry. 
 
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
We investigate how bank competition influences the use of collateral. This 
question is of major interest to assess the implications of the structural changes of the 
banking industry on the access to bank finance, owing to the dependence of this 
access to collateral requirements. 
We construct a theoretical model incorporating information asymmetries in a 
spatial competition framework. Banks can choose between screening the borrower or 
asking for collateral in the loan contract. Screening becomes more expensive as the 
distance between a bank and a firm increases. We show that increased competition in 
the banking industry makes the use of collateral in loan contracts less likely, by 
making the choice for screening more attractive. The model thus predicts that bank 
competition lowers the presence of collateral in loan contracts. 
In order to check this theoretical prediction, we develop an empirical cross-
country analysis based on the regression of the presence of collateral on bank 
competition as measured by the Lerner index. As predicted by the model, our tests 
  - 19 -provide evidence of a negative impact of bank competition on the presence of 
collateral. Robustness checks confirm this finding with alternative specifications. 
Thus, our paper shows that presence of collateral is more likely when bank 
competition is lower. As a consequence, the effects of bank competition on loan rates 
and on collateral use are complementary for the access to bank finance, as the 
reduction of loan rates is accompanied by lower collateral requirements. This 
conclusion is in line with the finding of Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2004) that greater bank concentration increases financing obstacles. Thus, taking 
measures that increase bank competition should improve firms’ access to finance. 
With more competition, a firm’s asset endowment becomes a less important 
prerequisite for getting a loan. In particular, in less developed countries where the 
types of assets that can potentially be pledged as collateral are limited and firms 
therefore find it difficult to get a loan, competition in the banking sector should be 
intensified. 
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  - 22 -Table 1 
List of countries 
 
 
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, Venezuela, Viet Nam. 
 
  - 23 -Table 2 
Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
Means and standard deviations for variables used in subsequent estimations. Sources: Dealscan for all loan 
characteristics; Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2000) for Financial Development,  Bank Costs and Bank 
Concentration; World Development Indicators for Economic Development; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 





Variable Description  Mean  Std  Dev. 
Loan characteristics    
Collateral  Loan is secured (1=yes)  0.498  0.500 
Maturity  Maturity of the loan in months  61.672  42.641 
Loan Size  Logarithm of the loan size ($000)  200.546  533.497 
Number of Lenders  Logarithm of the number of lenders  1.317  1.022 
Loan Type  Loan is a term loan (1=yes)  0.405  0.491 
Covenants  Loan includes covenants (1=yes)  0.278  0.448 
Country-level variables    
Lerner Index  Mean Lerner index  13.927  9.538 
Economic Development  Logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP  9.758  0.779 
Financial Development  Ratio of credit to private sector to GDP  1.016  0.369 
Bank Costs  Mean ratio of overhead costs to assets  0.027  0.013 
Creditor Rights  Index of creditors rights from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong)  2.440  1.061 
Rule of Law  Measure of “the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society” 
from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
0.910 0.806 




  - 24 -Table 3 
Main regressions 
 
Logit regressions for Collateral. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Standard errors are 
clustered by borrower and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in 
the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 








































































Creditor Rights  0.168*** 
(0.063) 
- -  0.101* 
(0.058) 
Rule of Law  -0.021 
(0.165) 
- -  -0.297*** 
(0.078) 
Log  likelihood  -2523.386 -2593.451 -2531.529 -2575.678 
Pseudo  R²  0.2617 0.2412 0.2593 0.2464 
N  4931 4931 4931 4931 
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Robustness tests: with bank concentration 
 
Logit regressions for Collateral. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Standard errors are 
clustered by borrower and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in 
the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 








































































Creditor Rights  0.276*** 
(0.062) 
- -  0.237*** 
(0.055) 
Rule of Law  -0.543*** 
(0.158) 
- -  -0.504*** 
(0.078) 
Likelihood  ratio  -2577.762 -2660.082 -2619.637 -2604.182 
Pseudo  R²  0.2458 0.2217 0.2335 0.2381 
N  4931 4931 4931 4931 
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Robustness tests: single-lender loans only 
 
Logit regressions for Collateral. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Standard errors are 
clustered by borrower and are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industries and years are included in 
the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
Explanatory variables  Estimations 
































































Creditor Rights  -0.0186 
(0.149) 
- -  0.025 
(0.134) 
Rule of Law  -0.4349 
(0.308) 
- -  -0.367** 
(0.157) 
Likelihood  ratio  -523.067 -531.747 -524.786 -526.189 
Pseudo  R²  0.3214 0.3101 0.3192 0.3173 
N  1173 1173 1173 1173 
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
From (IC.BF_L) we know that L=I. Moreover, the participation constraint of 
the good firm must hold: 
() () ()
() () (PC.GF_L)                            0 I p   -   1   -   R - X p






If the project is successful, a good firm repays R
L from the payoff X it generates. 
In the case of failure, collateralized assets in the amount of I are seized by the bank. 
The expected payoff when the investment is credit-financed has to be at least as high 
as the payoff from not investing (which is A). 
The bank will participate if it makes at least zero expected profit with the 
contract offered. The bank’s expected profit by each (good) firm is given by  
       PC.B_L      0 I I p 1 α pR
L ¡Ý     
which implies that it needs a repayment of at least 
L R . Since both banks are identical 
they cannot demand a higher repayment without losing all their customers.      Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Bank 1 undertakes the following consideration. According to bank 2’s 

















2 . The payoff 
the firm receives must fulfil the good firm’s participation constraint.   
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According to the participation constraint, the good firm must be better off by 
being able to realize the project and generate a return X and repay R
S than by not 
investing and getting the outside option of A. We have assumed that this is the case. 
Bank 1 does not have an incentive to demand a higher repayment because it would 
lose the firm to its competitor. By demanding   bank 1 receives an expected profit 










  - 28 -Proof of Lemma 3: 
Bank 1 offers a screening contract and bank 2 a collateralized contract. Given 
the offer bank 2 needs to break even, bank 1 can demand a repayment of   without 
losing the firm as a customer: 
SL R1
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or    I p - 1
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Bank 1’s expected profit per borrower with this repayment is: 
     cd I p
SL       1 1 1  







. Bank 2 makes zero expected profit. 
For firms located further away, bank 2 has lower costs of producing information than 
bank 1. This means that bank 2 can make a more attractive offer to the firm than bank 
1. Firms are indifferent between the screening contract of bank 1 (which needs a 
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In this case bank 1 makes zero expected profit because bank 2 serves all 
customers from this location and the bank gets a profit per borrower of 
  I p cd
SL       1 1 2 . Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
Suppose bank 1 offers a collateralized contract and bank 2 a screening contract. 
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1 and L=I. The resulting profit per borrower of bank 1 
is    I p d
N
c





    1 1
1
1                                                                     Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
We want to derive the Nash equilibrium. To do so, we first compare the best answers 
of bank 1 (bank 2) given the offer of bank 2 (bank 1). 
 
Best answers of bank 1 
-   Provided bank 2 offers a collateralized contract: 











 . For firms located further away bank 1 is indifferent between 
screening and collateralization because both contracts yield zero expected profits. 
-  Provided bank 2 offers a screening contract: 
Bank 1 compares  . Its payoff with a screening contract is higher for all 










 and therefore it offers a screening contract to all firms that are 
relatively close. To all other firms bank 1 offers a collateralized contract. 
 
Best answers of bank 2 
-   Provided bank 1 offers a collateralized contract: 
Bank 2 will always make zero expected profits independently of the contract it offers. 
Therefore, it is indifferent between the type of contract offered.  
-  Provided bank 1 offers a screening contract: 
Bank 2 compares  . For firms up to a distance of 
S SL

















 the profit is higher with a screening contract. For 
those further away bank 2 offers a collateralized contract. 
 
Due to the assumption that  () () I α 1 p 1  
N 4
c
- - < , the threshold values can be ranked as 
d
~




d   
-  Given that bank 2 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 1 chooses a screening 
contract. 
-  Given that bank 2 chooses a screening contract, bank 1 chooses a screening 
contract as well. 
-  Given that bank 1 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 2 is indifferent between 
a screening and a collateralized contract.  
  - 30 --  Given that bank 1 chooses a screening contract, bank 2 chooses a screening 
contract as well.  
The Nash equilibrium is that both banks offer a screening contract. 
 
2.  d ˆ d d
~
   
-  Given that bank 2 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 1 is indifferent between 
a screening and a collateralized contract. 
-  Given that bank 2 chooses a screening contract, bank 1 chooses a collateralized 
contract. 
-  Given that bank 1 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 2 is indifferent between 
a screening and a collateralized contract. 
-  Given that bank 1 chooses a screening contract, bank 2 chooses a screening 
contract as well.  
Thus, bank 1 weakly prefers a collateralized contract and bank 2 weakly prefers a 
screening contract. In equilibrium, firms are offered a collateralized contract by bank 








   
-  Given that bank 2 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 1 is indifferent between 
a screening and a collateralized contract. 
-  Given that bank 2 chooses a screening contract, bank 1 chooses a collateralized 
contract. 
-  Given that bank 1 chooses a collateralized contract, bank 2 is indifferent between 
a screening and a collateralized contract.  
-  Given that bank 1 chooses a screening contract, bank 2 chooses a collateralized 
contract.  
Thus, both banks weakly prefers a collateralized contract. In equilibrium, firms are 
financed by a collateralized contract by bank 1.                                             Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 











































As a result, the fraction of firms financed through a screening contract increases as the 
number of banks increases.                                                                                Q.E.D. 
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